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PRESUPPOSITION PROJECTION as
PROOF CONSTRUCTION
Emiel Krahmer  Paul Piwek
  Introduction
Van der Sandts  anaphoric account of presupposition is gen
erally considered to be the theory which makes the best empiri
cal predictions about presupposition projection see e	g	
 Beaver
	 The main insight is that there is an interesting cor
respondence between the behavior of anaphoric pronouns in dis
course and the projection of presuppositions in complex sentences	
Van der Sandt proposes to resolve presuppositions just like anaphoric
pronouns are resolved in Discourse Representation Theory DRT

Kamp  Reyle 	 Van der Sandt contends that there is also
an important dierence between pronouns and presuppositions
when there is no antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun
 the sen
tence containing the pronoun cannot be interpreted	 However

when there is no antecedent for a presupposition  and the pre
supposition has sucient descriptive content  then the presup
position can be accommodated and
 as it were
 create its own
antecedent	 This combination of resolution and accommodation
constitutes the empirical strength of Van der Sandts approach	
A problem with Van der Sandts approach is that it does not
take the inuence of world knowledge into account see e	g	
 Beaver
 	 Consider
 a	 If John is married
 his wife probably walks the dog	

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b	 If John buys a car
 he checks the motor rst	
c	 If Spaceman Spi lands on planet X
 he will be annoyed
by the fact that his weight is higher than it would be on
earth	 Beaver 
Example 	a contains a denite description
 his wife
 which
triggers the presupposition that John has a wife	 For the correct
treatment of this example
 a rather trivial piece of world knowl
edge is needed if a man is married
 he has a wife	 But
 if we
do not take this piece of world knowledge into account
 the the
ory of Van der Sandt  is not able to treat being married
as an antecedent for the presupposition triggered by his wife	
Being married creates an implied antecedent for his wife	 A
more substantial usage of world knowledge is required for example
	b
 which is an example of the notorious bridging phenomenon
Clark 	 The description the motor presupposes the ex
istence of a motor	 Since there is no proper antecedent for this
denite description
 the theory of Van der Sandt  predicts
that the presupposition is accommodated	 But this fails to do
justice to the intuition that the mentioning of a car somehow li
censes the use of the motor and that the motor is part of the
car which John buys	 Example 	c also illustrates the need for
world knowledge	 The the fact that S construction presupposes
S  thus the consequent of 	c presupposes that Spaceman Spis
weight is higher than it would be on earth	 Since there is no ob
vious way to bind this presupposition
 Van der Sandts account
predicts that it is accommodated	
The claim that world knowledge has an inuence on presup
position projection is hardly revolutionary	 For instance
 Van der
Sandt seems to assume that world knowledge somehow inuences
presupposition projection Van der Sandt 
 fn	 
 but he
gives no clues on how world knowledge interacts with his theory
of presupposition	 The central question addressed in this chapter
is how to account for the inuence of world knowledge on presup

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position projection	 We argue that employing a class of mathe
matical formalisms known as Constructive Type Theories CTT

see e	g	
 MartinLof 
 Barendregt  allows us to answer
this question	 To do so
 we reformulate Van der Sandts theory in
terms of CTT	 CTT diers from other proof systems in that for
each proposition which is proven
 CTT also delivers a proofobject
which shows how the proposition was proven	
 
As we shall see

the presence of these proofobjects is useful from the presuppo
sitional point of view	 Additionally
 CTT contexts contain more
information than is conveyed by the ongoing discourse
 and there
is a formal interaction between this background knowledge and
the representation of the current discourse	 This means that the
reformulation of Van der Sandts theory in terms of CTT is not
just a nice technical exercise
 but actually creates interesting new
possibilities where the interaction between presupposition resolu
tion and world knowledge is concerned	

 Presuppositions as Anaphors
Van der Sandt  proposes to resolve presuppositions
 just
like anaphoric pronouns are resolved in DRT	 For this purpose
he develops a metalevel resolution algorithm	 The input of this
algorithm is an underspecied Discourse Representation Structure
 
For us the constructive aspect resides in the explicit construction of proof
objects we are not committed to an underlying intuitionistic logic

In spirit our work is related to Ahn 	
 Beun  Kievit 
 and
Krause 
 Krause presents a typetheoretical approach to presupposi
tions His system not only allows binding of presuppositions but also has
the possibility to globally accommodate them using an abductive inferencing
mechanism One important dierence with our approach is that we take the
entire theory of Van der Sandt including intermediate and local accommoda
tion
 and rephrase it in terms of CTT Ahn and Beun  Kievit use CTT for
dealing with the resolution of denite expressions The latter focus on select
ing the right referent which may be found in the linguistic context but also
in the physical context
 using concepts such as prominence and agreement

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DRS
 which contains one or more unresolved presuppositions	
When all these presuppositions have been resolved
 a proper DRS
remains
 which can be interpreted in the standard way	

Consider

 and its Van der Sandtian representation
 drs 
 If a Chihuahua enters the room
 the dog snarls	
drs 
x
Chihuahuax

enterx

 
snarly

y
dogy

The denite description the dog presupposes the existence of a
dog	 Van der Sandt models this by adding an embedded
 presup
positional DRS to the representation of the consequent expressing
that there is a dog	 To resolve the presuppositional DRS
 we do
what we would do to resolve a pronoun look for a suitable
 acces
sible antecedent	 In this case
 we nd one the discourse referent
x introduced in the antecedent is accessible
 and suitable since a
Chihuahua is a dog	 As said above
 it is unclear how this informa
tion can be employed in Van der Sandts theory
 but for now let us
simply assume that we can bind the presupposition	 The presup
positional DRS is removed
 and the y in the condition snarly is
replaced with the newly found antecedent x	
drs 
x
Chihuahuax

enterx

 
snarlx


In Krahmer 
 Van der Sandts theory is combined with a version
of DRT with a partial interpretation In this way DRSs which contain unre
solved presuppositions can also be interpreted which is shown to have several
advantages

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Anaphoric pronouns need to be bound	 For presuppositions this is
dierent they can also be accommodated
 provided the presuppo
sition contains sucient descriptive content	 Reconsider example
 on Van der Sandts approach globally accommodating the
presupposition associated with the dog amounts to removing the
presuppositional DRS from the consequent DRS and placing it in
the main DRS
 with drs  as result	
drs 
y
dogy

x
Chihuahuax

enterx

 
snarly

This DRS represents the presuppositional reading of 
 which
may be paraphrased as there is a dog and if a Chihuahua en
ters the aforementioned dog snarls	

Now we have two ways of
dealing with the presupposition in example 
 so the question
may arise which of these two is the best one	 To answer that
question
 Van der Sandt  gives some general rules for
preferences
 which may be put informally as follows  Binding
is preferred over accommodation
 	 Accommodation is preferred
as high as possible
 
 Binding is preferred as low as possible	
Thus according to Van der Sandt drs  the binding reading
is preferred over drs  the accommodation reading	

The
second preference rule suggests that there is more than one way
to accommodate a presupposition
 and indeed there is	 Consider

This DRS as the previous ones
 are presented in the usual pictorial
fashion Below we also use a linear notation which we trust to be self
explanatory For example in this linear notation the current DRS looks as
follows yj dogy
 x j Chihuahuax
 enterx
    jsnarly
 

It has been argued that examples like 
 in which there is a partial
match between anaphor and antecedent are ambiguous between a binding and
an accommodation reading See eg Krahmer  Van Deemter 
 for an
analysis of partial match ambiguities Here we will ignore this issue

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 It is not true that I feed Johns Chihuahua
 since he doesnt
have one
Here global accommodation of the presupposition triggered by
Johns Chihuahua yields an inconsistent DRS	 This is prohibited
by one of Van der Sandt s conditions on accommoda
tion	 Therefore the presupposition is accommodated locally 
 i	e	

within the scope of the negation	
In the next section
 we discuss CTT and show how Van der
Sandts approach can be rephrased in terms of it	 In the Section
thereafter
 we will see how the examples in 
 which are prob
lematic for Van der Sandts approach as it stands
 can be dealt
with	 We believe that the CTT approach leads to better results
than adding a proofsystem to DRT
 as done in e	g	
 Saurer 	
The main advantage of CTT is that it is a standard proof system
developed in mathematics with wellunderstood metatheoretical
properties see Ahn  Kolb  for discussion on the advan
tages of reformulating DRT in CTT	 Moreover
 the presence of
explicit proofobjects turns out to have some additional advan
tages for our present purposes	
 The Deductive Perspective
We introduce CTT by comparing it with DRT this comparison
is based on Ahn  Kolb 
 who present a formal translation
of DRSs into CTT expressions	 In CTT
 a context is modelled
as an ordered sequence of introductions	 Introductions are of the
form V T 
 where V is a variable and T is the type of the variable	
Consider example 	a and its DRT representation 	b in the
linear notation
 cf	 footnote 	
 a	 A dog snarls	
b	 x j dogx snarlx

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A discourse referent can be modelled in CTT as a variable	 A
referent is added to the context by means of an introduction which
not only adds the variable but also xes its type	 We choose entity
as the type of discourse referents	 Thus
 we add x  entity to the
context	 entity itself also requires introduction	 Since entity is a
type
 we write entity  type	
In general
 a type T can only be used after the type of T itself
or the parts of which T has been composed has been specied
in the context with an introduction e	g	
 T  T
 
	 However
 the
introduction of the aforementioned type type is not carried out in
the context it is taken care of by an axiom which says that type  
where   is to be understood as the mother of all types can be
derived in the empty context   type  	
DRTs conditions correspond to introductions V  T 
 where T
is of the type prop short for proposition
 which comes with the
following axiom   prop   	 For instance
 the introduction
y  dog x corresponds to the condition dogx	 The type dog x
of type prop is obtained by applying the type dog to the object
x	 Therefore
 it depends on the introductions of x and dog	 Since
dog x should be of the type prop
 dog must be a function type
from the set of entities into propositions
 i	e	
 dog entity  prop	
The introduction y dog x involves the variable y of the type
dog x	 The variable y is said to be an inhabitant of dog x	
Curry and Feys  came up with the idea that propositions
can be seen as classifying proofs this is known as the propositions
as types  proofs as objects interpretation	 This means that the
aforementioned introduction states that there is a proof y for the
proposition dogx	 The second condition of 	b
 snarlx
 can be
dealt with along the same lines this yields z snarlx	 Thus
 the
CTT counterpart to the DRS 	b contains the following three
introductions x entity y dog x z snarlx	
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Dependent Function Types In DRT
 the proposition Every
thing sucks is translated into A DRS containing the implicative
condition x j thingx   j suckx	 In CTT
 this proposition
corresponds to the type  x entitysuck x
 which is a dependent
function type	 It describes functions from the type entity into the
type suck x	 The range of such a function suck x depends on
the object x to which it is applied	 Suppose that we have an
inhabitant f of this function type
 i	e	
 f   x  entitysuck x	
Then we have a function which
 when it is applied to an arbitrary
object y
 yields an inhabitant of the proposition suck y	 Thus
 f
is a constructive proof for the proposition that Everything sucks	
Of course
 function types can be nested	 Consider the pred
icate snarl	 We suggested to introduce it as a function from
entities to propositions	 One could
 however
 argue that snarl
is a predicate which only applies to dogs	 In that case
 it would
have to be introduced as a function from entities to another func
tion
 i	e	
 the function from a proof that the entity is a dog to a
proposition
 that is snarl   x entity p dog xprop	 We will
abbreviate this as snarl  x entity p dog x  prop	
Inference The core of CTT consists of a set of derivation rules
with which one can determine the type of an object in a given
context	 These rules are also suited for searching for an object
belonging to a particular type	 There is
 for instance
 a rule which
is similar to modus ponens in propositional logic in the rule below

T x  a stands for a T such that all free occurrences of x in T
have been substituted by a	 Furthermore
 !  E T means that in
context !
 the statement E T holds
!  F   x AB !  a A
!  F a Bx  a
For instance
 if a context ! contains the introductions b  entity
and g   y  entitysuck y Everything sucks
 then we can use
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this rule to nd an inhabitant of the type suck  b	 In other words

our goal is to nd a substitution S such that !  P suckbS	 The
substitution S should assign a value to P 	 P is a socalled gap	 A
CTT expression with a gap is an underspecied representation of
a proper CTT expression if the gap is lled
 then a proper CTT
expression is obtained	 The deduction rule tells us that g  b
can be substituted for P 
 if !  g   y  entitysuck  y and
!  b  entity	 Both socalled judgements are valid
 because we
assumed that g   y entitysuck y and b entity are members of
!	 Thus
 we can conclude that !  g b suck b	
Presuppositions as Gaps A DRS is the end product of the
interpretation of a sentence with respect to a main DRS	 Ahn 
Kolb  show that this end product can be translated into
a corresponding CTT context	 Van der Sandts presuppositional
DRSs can be seen as a kind of proto DRSs of which the presup
positional representations have not yet been resolved	 Only after
binding and"or accommodation of the presuppositional represen
tations a proper DRS is produced	 Analogously
 in CTT terms

a construction algorithm could translate a sentence into a proto
type before a proper type of the type prop is returned	

This
proper type i	e	
 proposition can then be added to the main con
text by introducing a fresh proof for it	 For example
 this is the
appropriate proto type for example 

 x entity y chihuahuax z entersx 
snarlY 
Y 	entityP 	dogY 


We assume that one sentence translates into one type The attentive
reader may wonder how this agrees with our earlier translation of 	a
 In
fact it corresponds to the following single introduction g  x  entityy 
dogxsnarlx

 given some appropriate standard derivation rules eg Martin
Lof 	 Ranta 	


Recall that this abbreviates x  entityy  chihuahua xz  enters 
xsnarlY
Y 	entityP 	dog Y 






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Thus
 if x is an entity
 y is a proof that x is a Chihuahua and z
is a proof that x enters
 then there exists a proof that Y snarls

where Y is a gap to be lled by an entity for which we can prove
that it is a dog	

The presuppositional annotation consists of a
sequence of introductions with gaps	

Filling the Gaps Before we can evaluate the CTT representa
tion  given some context !
 we rst have to resolve the presup
position by lling the gaps	 For this purpose
 we have developed
an algorithm sketched in the appendix which can be seen as a
reimplementation of Van der Sandts resolution algorithm
 but
now operating on CTT expressions	 The rst thing we do after
starting the resolution process
 is try to ll the gap by binding
it	 The question whether we can bind the presupposition triggered
by the dog in example  can be phrased in CTT as follows is

The notion of gaps can also be applied to the analysis of questions in CTT
Piwek 
 A question introduces gaps which can be lled by extending the
context of interpretation with the answer provided by the dialogue participant
A question is answered when the associated gaps can be lled

To be complete let us give the syntactic denition of proto types For
that we need the denition of a proper type
T  V j type j prop j   j V  TT 
 j V  TT 
 j T T 

A proto type T

can be obtained by substituting gaps G
 for one or more of
the types of some proper type T  The result is a Type with Gaps TG
 An
annotation has to be attached to T with gaps
 for specifying the types of the
gaps A TG with one or more annotations A
 is a Proto Type PT 

TG  G j V j type j prop j   j V  TGTG
 j V  TGTG
 j
TGTG

A  TG  TG jAA
PT  TG j PT
A
j V  PTPT 
 j V  PTPT 
 j PT PT 

P  Q represents the concatenation of sequences P and Q often writ
ten as PQ
 Notice that the denition permits annotation of expressions
which are already annotated This is required for representing embedded
presuppositions

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there a substitution S such that the following can be proven#
   
 ! x entity y chihuahua x z enter x 

Y entity P dog Y S
In words is it possible to prove the existence of a dog from the
global context ! extended with the local context the antecedent
of the conditional# The answer is that depends on !	 Suppose
for the sake of argument that ! itself does not introduce any dogs

but that it does contain the information that a Chihuahua is a
dog	 Technically
 this means that  is a member of !
 f  a entity b chihuahua a dog a
Given this function
 we nd a substitution S for 
 mapping
Y to x and P to f x y which is the result of applying the
aforementioned function f to x and y	
 
So we ll the gaps using
the substitution S
 remove the annotations which have done their
job and continue with the result
 x entity y chihuahuax z enter x  snarlx
Thus
 intuitively
 if an interpreter knows that a Chihuahua is a
dog
 she will be able to bind the presupposition triggered by the
denite the dog in 	 Now suppose the interpreter does not
know that a Chihuahua is a dog or is of the opinion that Chi
huahuas simply are not proper dogs	 That is
 ! does not contain
a function mapping Chihuahuas to dogs	 Then
 still under the as
sumption that ! does not introduce any dogs
 the interpreter will
not be able to prove the existence of a dog	 She can then try to
 
In general  

C
 
     C
n
abbreviates   C
 
      C
n

  
Interestingly Zeevat 
 compares the Van der Sandtian resolution of
a presupposition with answering a query in PROLOG requiring the instan
tiation of a variable
 
The  representing function application
 is leftassociative thus f x y
should be read as f x
y

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accommodate the existence of a dog by replacing the gaps Y and
P with fresh variables
 say y
 
and p
 

 and extending the context !
with y
 
entity p
 
dog y
 
	 Of course
 it has to be checked whether
this move is adequate
 whether the result of accommodation is
consistent and informative	
 
For more details on the resolution
algorithm also of intermediate
 
and  our alternative for  local
accommodation the reader is referred to the appendix	
 Using World Knowledge
Bridging From our perspective
 bridging amounts to using world
knowledge to ll gaps	 Consider example 	b again
 with its CTT
representation given in 	
 x entity y car x z buy xj 
check Y j
Y 	entityP 	motorY 

Before we can add this expression to some context !
 we have
to resolve the presuppositional expression	 We rst search for a
substitution S such that  can be proven
 ! x entity y car x z buy xj 

Y entity P motorY S
When can the motor be understood as a bridging anaphor li
censed by the introduction of a car# If the interpreter knows that
a car has a motor	 Modelling this knowledge could go as follows
! contains two functions one function which maps each car to an
entity
 f  a  entity b  car a  entity
 and one function which
states that this entity is the cars motor g  a entity b car a 
 
For more information of the background and formalization of these con
straints see Van der Sandt 

 
Intermediate accommodation is not entirely uncontroversial For instance
it has been argued that the intermediate readings are achieved in a dierent
way eg by quanticational restriction see eg Beaver 


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motorf ab	 Using these two functions
 we nd a substitution
S in 
 mapping Y to f xy and P to gxy	 We can look at the
resulting proofobjects as the bridge which has been constructed
by the interpreter it makes the link with the introduction of a car
explicit by using x and y and indicates which inference steps the
user had to make to establish the connection with the motor by
using the functions f and g	 So
 we can ll the gaps
 assuming
that the proofs satisfy certain conditions	 Of course
 they have
to satisfy the usual Van der Sandt conditions	 Additionally
 the
bridge itself has to be plausible	 What plausibility exactly is
 is
beyond the scope of this chapter but see Section 	 We would like
to point out
 however
 that the presence in CTT of explicit proof
objects indicating precisely which pieces of knowledge have been
used
 facilitates plausibilitychecking	 For example
 we contend
that the complexity of the proofobject is inversely proportional
to the plausibility of the bridge	
 
Let us now consider a somewhat more complex example	
 John walked into the room	 The chandelier shone brightly	
after Clark 
Assume that the rst sentence of  has already been processed

which means that the context ! at least contains the following
introductions x  entity y  room x z  walk in x  j	 Now
 we
encounter the CTT representation of the second sentence
 q shineY
Y 	entityP 	chandelierY 

We want to resolve the presupposition triggered by the chande
lier in the context ! assuming that ! does not introduce any
chandeliers	 When would an interpreter be able to link the chan
delier to the room John entered# Of course
 it would be easy if
 
For a given proofobject we can determine which atomic proofobjects from
the context have been used and how many times Thus in the aforementioned
f xy three atomic proofs are used namely f  x and y

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she had some piece of knowledge to the eect that every room
has a chandelier if her ! would contain functions which for each
room produce a chandelier	 However
 such knowledge is hardly
realistic many rooms do not have a chandelier	
In a more realistic scenario
 the following might happen	 The
interpreter tries to prove the existence of a chandelier
 but fails
to do so	 However
 she knows that a chandelier is a kind of lamp
and the existence of a lamp can be proven using the room just
mentioned and the background knowledge that rooms have lamps	
Formally
 and analogous to the motor example
 ! contains one
function which produces an entity for each room f  a entity b 
rooma entity
 and one which states that this entity is a lamp
g  a entity b rooma lampf ab	 Since the speaker has
uttered  the interpreter will assume that one of the lamps
in the room is a chandelier	
 
In terms of the CTT approach
the interpreter infers that the room which John entered contains
an entity which is a lamp applying the aforementioned piece of
knowledge the functions f and g
 and then binds part of the
presupposition by lling the Y gap with fxy the inferred lamp	
The remaining part of the presupposition that the lamp is in fact
a chandelier is now accommodated in the usual way by lling the
P gap with a fresh variable	
 
 
 
Notice that according to this picture both the anaphor and the antecedent
play a role in constructing the bridge see for instance Milward 

 
Where does bridging t in with Van der Sandts preference hierarchy We
hypothesize that rule  mentioned in Section  should be restated as a
Binding to a noninferred antecedent is preferred to accommodation and b
Binding to a noninferred antecedent is preferred to binding to an inferred
antecedent Whether binding to an implied antecedent is preferred over ac
commodation or vice versa cannot be stated in a general way this again
depends on the plausibility
 
It has been observed that binding a pronominal anaphor to an implied
antecedent is generally impossible This follows from our present approach
the descriptive content of a pronoun is so small that there will in general be
many inferred objects meeting what little descriptive content there is thus

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Summarizing if the bridge between wouldbe anaphor and
wouldbe antecedent is fully derivable using world knowledge
 the
presupposition can be bound	 Thus
 binding plays a more substan
tial r$ole than in Van der Sandts original theory
 as presuppositions
can be bound to both inferred and noninferred antecedents	 On
the other hand
 if the bridge between anaphor and antecedent
is not fully derivable
 the missing link will be accommodated	
So
 accommodation is still a repairstrategy
 as in Van der Sandts
original approach
 but now there is generally less to repair	 In most
cases
 accommodation will amount to assuming a more specic
description of a deduced object in this case
 that the lamp whose
existence has been proven is actually a chandelier	
 
Notice
 
nally
 that our approach to bridging is deliberately not lexical	

 Yesterday somebody parked a car in front of my door
 and
the dog howled awfully	
This example can be understood in a bridgingmanner given the
right background knowledge	 Suppose
 it is well known between
resulting in an unresolvable ambiguity Notice that this approach does not
preclude that sometimes a pronoun can refer back to a inferred antecedent
Consider Did you hear that John nally is going to get married She must be
very rich In such cases one implied antecedent Johns future wife
 seems
to be more prominent than all others
 
In this respect our approach to bridging is comparable to the one ad
vocated in Hobbs 
 and in particular in Hobbs et al 
 One
important dierence between our approach and theirs is that we take the pre
suppositionhood of the bridging anaphor as one of the central characteristics
This separation of presupposed and asserted material enables us to resolve
bridging anaphors even in cases where the asserted material is inconsistent
with the context A similar point is made in Asher  Lascarides 

who argue that rhetorical relations are an important factor for processing
bridging NPs

As opposed to eg Bos Buitelaar  Mineur 
 where bridging is
analyzed by the addition of qualiastructures to Van der Sandts presupposition
theory As Bos Buitelaar  Mineur put it a qualiastructure can be seen as
a set of lexical entailments Our main objection to this approach is that not
all implied antecedents are lexical entailments as example 
 illustrates

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the speaker and the interpreter that the former lives opposite a dog
hotel somewhere in the countryside
 and all the cars which stop in
front of this hotel and hence in front of the speakers door either
drop a dog or pick one up	 In this context
 the hearer will have no
trouble constructing the required bridge since she has a mental
function which produces a dog for each car stopping in front of
the speakers door	 For more examples
 we refer to Krahmer 
Piwek 	
Conditionals and Presuppositions One attractive feature of
the CTT view on discourse is that we get discourse markers for
propositions for free	 This is useful
 for instance
 in the case of
propositional presuppositions
 of which the fact that S construc
tion is an example cf	 	c	 According to Stalnaker 
 a
proposition which is presupposed should be part of the context
common background	 In terms of CTT
 this means that a proof
for the proposition should be derivable in the context	 The latter
interpretation agrees nicely with the dictum of presuppositions as
anaphors the proof of the proposition acts as the required an
tecedent cf	
 Ranta 	
In order to make this idea more precise
 let us give the proto
type for example 	c	 For the sake of simplicity we treat an
noyed by the fact that as a complex predicate annoyed is a
function which applied to a person
 a proposition and a proof for
the proposition yields a new proposition
 annoyed  x  entity q 
prop r q prop
 p  landspplx
annoyedspweigth higher spP 
P 	weight highersp

The basic structure of this proto type is %  &

	
 
The algo
rithm sketched in the appendix proceeds as follows	 It rst tries
 
This proto type contains some simplications the meaning of some
parts of the sentence has not been analysed to the fullest detail we stipu

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to bind the presupposition
 in the context of ! extended with
% the conditionals antecedent	 In this case
 % seems to pro
vide no proper antecedent for the presupposition	 World knowl
edge can
 however
 change the picture dramatically	 Suppose
that the interpreter knows that if something lands on planet X
then its weight will be higher than it would be on earth
 formally
f  x  entity q  land x plx  weight higher x	 In that case

the presupposition can be bound	 The appropriate substitution
for the presupposition P 
 namely f  sp  p
 is obtained by using
world knowledge and the information given in the conditionals
antecedent	
Now
 suppose there is not sucient information in the con
text to nd a binder for the presupposition	 Then some piece of
information will have to be accommodated	 First
 the algorithm
attempts to globally accommodate the presupposition	 This re
sults in a rather awkward reading
 paraphrasable as Spaceman
Spis weight is higher than it would be on earth and if he lands
on planet X it will bother him that his weight is higher than it
would be on earth	 Beaver explains this awkwardness by pointing
out that the sentence will typically be uttered in a situation where
Spi is hanging somewhere in space	 Most of us know that in space
one is weightless	 So for the average interpreter
 global accommo
dation of Spis weight is higher than it would be on earth can
be blocked adding this proposition to a context containing the
information that Spi is weightless will enable the interpreter to
derive an inconsistency given some other fairly common pieces of
information
 e	g	
 on earth one is not weightless	
If global accommodation is ruled out
 there are two possibilities
left intermediate and local accommodation	 Here
 let us consider
the reading involving local accommodation cf	 footnote 	 We
late that Spi	
s weight is higher than it would be on earth corresponds to
weight higher sp Additionally some presuppositions are already resolved
Spi	 to the variable sp and planet X to plx
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model Van der Sandts local accommodation as follows given a
CTT expression of the form % &

as 
 the algorithm adds
%  to the global context
 i	e	 we model local accommodation
as global accommodation of a conditional presupposition	

 Conclusions
We rephrased Van der Sandts presuppositions as anaphors the
ory in terms of CTT
 and showed that this facilitates the formal
interaction between world knowledge and presupposition projec
tion	 To illustrate this interaction
 we applied the CTT version
of the presuppositions as anaphors approach to Clarks bridging
cases and Beavers conditional presuppositions	 These phenom
ena
 which are beyond the scope of theory presented in Van der
Sandt 
 could be dealt with in a straightforward fashion	 An
important factor in our analyses is the presence of explicit proof
objects
 which is one of the characteristic properties of CTT	
There are
 however
 still a lot of open questions	 When is
bridge a illformed# Why do listeners prefer one bridge over an
other# And
 why should a listener construct a bridge in the rst
place# In fact
 Clark  already provided part of the answers
to these questions	 For example
 he noted that bridging is a de
terminate process
 which has to satisfy certain criteria	 Among

The advantage of this alternative can be illustrated using another example
from Beaver 
 It is unlikely that if Spaceman Spi	 lands on planet X he
will be annoyed by the fact that his weight is higher than it would be on earth
Van der Sandts local accommodation produces the following interpretation
for this sentence It is unlikely that if Spaceman Spi	 lands on planet X his
weight will be higher than it would be on earth and he will be annoyed by this
fact Beaver 
 remarks that Van der Sandts reading does not entail
that if Spaceman Spi	 lands on planet X his weight will be higher than it
would be on earth it even suggest the opposite
 whereas it intuitively should
According to our redenition of local accommodation the latter sentence does
follow from the adjusted
 global context

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other things
 Clark proposes a general stopping rule which essen
tially says that listeners build the shortest possible bridge that is
consistent with the context	 In Krahmer  Piwek in prep	 it is
argued that the CTT perspective can account for this constraint

as well as softer constraints having to do with relevance and
plausibility 
 in an elegant manner as conditions on proofobjects	
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A The Resolution Algorithm
Let  be the CTT representation of the current utterance and  the cur
rent global context The following algorithm written in Pseudo PRO
LOG  tells us how to resolve the presuppositions of  if any in the
context of  C is a variable representing the relevant context consist
ing of the  extended with temporary assumptions eg antecedents of
conditionals Initially C is set equal to  ie C 	
  The basic
clause goes as follows	
resolve C 	 atomic
If  is atomic ie not of the form V 	 also abbreviated as V 	 
 and not containing presuppositional annotations then the resolution
of  in the context of C is  Here is the recursive clause which deals
with expressions  stands for concatenation
resolveV 	 CV 	
 

 
 	 resolve C
 

C
 
	
 C   C
resolveC
 
 V 	
 

 


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In words	 when the resolution algorithm encounters an expression of the
form V 	 in context C then it rst resolves all the presuppositions
in  and when  is totally devoid of presuppositional annotations the
algorithm resolves the presuppositions of  with respect to the modied
context the original C possibly extended with the accommodation of
presuppositions which arose in 
 
 and V 	 
 

 
The rst clause to
deal with resolution proper is the one for binding 
 
resolve
 
 C
 
 	 binderC S
resolveS C
 

Where binder is dened as follows	 binderC S 	 S  fS

jC 
S

g preferredS When there is more than one possible binding it
is determined which is the most preferred one where preference is de
ned in terms of the number of intervening introductions the complexity
of proofobjects etc If there are two equally preferred bindings an un
resolvable ambiguity results If there is no binder for a presupposition
we try to globally accommodate it
resolve
 
 C
 
 	 adequateS
 
 C
addS
 

resolveS
 
 C  S
 

 

Here and elsewhere S
 
is the assignment which maps any gaps in  to
fresh variables of the right type Thus	 if it is possible to accommo
date the presupposition then we may add it to the context  and go on
resolving any remaining presuppositions in  with respect to the new
extended context adequate checks whether the result of accommoda
tion in a given context meets the Van der Sandtian conditions ie is

 C gives those introductions which are present in  but not in C ie
have been added to the global context  since the beginning of resolution

V 

is temporarily added assumed
 to the context in order to resolve
any presuppositions in  

We have decided to code the preferences binding over accommodation
etc
 into the algorithm itself This choice is not forced upon us it is just more
e!cient than calculating all possible resolutions and order them afterwards

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consistent and informative
 
If binding and global accommodation are
not possible we try intermediate accommodation	
resolve
 
 C
 
 	 not emptyC  
adequate  S
 
 C
resolve   S
 
 C
 

Thus	 if we are in an embedded conguration that is	 there is a dif
ference between   the global context  and C  the extension of the
global context with a local context  and the result of intermediate
accommodation is adequate then we use intermediate accommodation
Finally here is our version for local accommodation
 
resolve
 
 C 
 

 
 	 emptyC  

 
	
 S
 

resolveS
 
 C  
 

 

resolve
 
 C
 
 	 not emptyC  
 	
 C  
adequatef 	   S
 

addf 	   S
 

resolveS
 
 C  f 	   S
 

 


V T is consistent in the context of  if it is not the case that there is an
E such that  V  T  E  that is adding V  T to  makes  provable

V  T is informative in the context of  if it is not the case that there is an
E such that   E T ie T does not follow from  already
 A sequence of
introductions is informative if it contains an informative introduction Notice
that adequacy is tested wrt to C while the presupposition is added to 
This is done to capture the subDRSs clause of Van der Sandt  
iii

 Notice moreover that Van der Sandts trappingcondition which states
that no variable may end up being free after resolution
 is encoded in the CTT
framework itself a variable cannot occur in a context where its type is not
declared

Since  may consist of a number of introductions a
 
b
 
     a
n
b
n
we use
an abbreviation here For instance g  x  entity p  car x  a
 
 entity a


motor a
 is an abbreviation of g
 
 x  entity p  car x   entity
 and
g

 x entity p carx  motorg
 
xp



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We distinguish two cases	 
 
   and    
 
 Notice that Van der
Sandts local accommodation of  in    
 
is modelled as global 
accommodation of a function f 	   where f is fresh
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